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I.  Is there  a  consumption  "problem?" 
The  choice  of  "consumption"  as the  theme  of the  Human  Development 
Report  raises  the  question  of  whether  there  is  a  particular 
"problem" with consumption? What is the relationship of consumption 
to  human  development?  will  the  Report  contain  an  implicit  or 
explicit critique of  consumption  in contemporary societies? 
At least two very important problems are well-recognized.  The first 
is  inadequate  levels  of  consumption  among  a  large  segment  of  the 
world's population. Here the consumption problem is often conceived 
of as one of exclusion within a  two-group or two-class structure--
those with  "enough"  and  those without  enough.  A  second problem is 
the ecological impacts of consumption.  Both these issues are being 
addressed by others,  so I  do not discuss them in this paper.  I  turn 
instead to  another question.  Assuming  that the problem of poverty 
could be solved,  so that everyone in the world had "enough"  in some 
basic  sense,  and  assuming  that  the  ecological  impacts  of 
consumption  could  be  minimized,  is  there  still  a  "problem"  with 
consumption?  The  argument  of  this  paper  is  yes,  there  are 
structural  problems  associated  with  consumption  in  modern 
capitalist societies.  (For  a  different,  but related critique,  see 
Schor  1997c.) 
1 Within economics,  the traditional approach is to posit consumption 
as  the  "solution"  to  wants  and  needs.  In  a  classic  utilitarian 
sense,  consumption eliminates pain and produces pleasure.  In a  more 
general  formulation,  it  creates  "utility"  or  "well-being." 
Consumption  is  a  good  which  solves  the  problem  of  various  bads 
(hunger,  cold,  boredom,  etc.).  For  the  most  part,  traditional 
approaches emphasize the functional characteristics of consumption 
goods'  or  services  (in an  a-social  sense  of  functional).  Clothing 
keeps  one warm or is aesthetically pleasing,  food satisfies hunger 
or a  discriminating palette, transportation moves one from place to 
place.  To  the  extent  that  economists  talk  about  the  content  of 
consumption they tend to emphasize these a-social aspects.  This is 
in part because they assume that utility functions are independent 
among  individuals,  so  that  social  effects  are  ruled  out  by 
assumption.  Such  a  functional  approach is also consistent with the 
view that consumption is a  solution rather than a  problem.  Once  we 
discard  the  assumption  of  inter-personal  independence  of  utility 
functions,  and  allow  inter-personal comparisons,  the relationship 
between consumption and welfare becomes far more  complex,  and more 
empirically realistic. Furthermore, it is through this door that we 
can  introduce  some  of  the  most  important  structural  critiques  of 
modern consumer behavior.  (For a  review of the standard literature, 
see  Deaton  1992.) 
II.  A  Social Model  of consumption:  When  Inter-personal  comparison 
2 Does  Matter 
A.  Social Class "Structures"  consumption 
In the traditional economic approach,  the pattern of consumption is 
predicted  to  be  either  a  random  distribution  (of  goods  and 
services)  which  reflects  individual  tastes  and  preferences  or  a 
distribution which reflects merely the availability of  income.  In 
fact,  neither  of  these  expectations  is  borne  out  empirically. 
Rather,  the  distribution  of  both  taste  and  consumption  outcomes 
corresponds  to  a  definite  structure,  among  whose  defining 
characteristics  are  social  and  economic  class.  2  People  of  like 
class background have common tastes and consumption patterns. There 
are  shared  social  meanings  which  are  associated  with  consumer 
goods.  These  differences  cannot  be  attributed  only  to  functional 
needs  (i.e.,  people  with  large  families  buy  station wagons),  but 
are  also  present  in  situations  where  no  or  few  functional 
considerations apply  (i.e.,  taste in art or music,  food,  style of 
decor) . 
The  classic  twentieth  century  works  on  the  social  patterning  of 
consumption  by  class  are  Thorstein  Veblen's  The  Theory  of  the 
Leisure Class and Pierre Bourdieu's Distinction:  A Social critique 
of  the  Judgment  of  Taste.  Veblen  argued  that  "conspicuous 
consumption," i.  e., the visible display of discretionary spending, 
was  the  means  by  which  individuals  revealed  their  economic 
resources  and  established  social  position.  In  his  model,  goods 
diffuse through a  vertical class hierarchy by means of an emulative 
3 process  occurring  at  each  level.  Bourdieu  begins  from  an 
essentially Veblenian perspective, but provides an updated and more 
complex  rendering.  (Veblen  has  a  linear  class  structure,  while 
Bourdieu  provides  a  "map"  with  both  vertical  and  horizontal 
structures.)  In Bourdieu's account,  both economic and what he calls 
cultural capital affect consumption patterns.  Individuals acquire 
cultural  capital  through  family  socialization  and  educational 
background  and  this  cultural  capital  shapes  their  tastes  and 
preferences.  Taste,  and  the  consumption  outcomes  associated  with 
it, becomes  an expression of class position.3  From the Introduction 
to Distinction.  (While  in this  passage  Bourdieu  is talking  about 
art  and  culture,  his  work  covers  a  wider  range  of  consumption 
categories  including  food  and  styles  of  decor  and  home 
furnishings. ) 
There  is  an  economy  of  cultural  goods,  but  it  has  a 
specif  ic logic ...  Whereas the ideology of charisma regards 
taste  in  legitimate  culture  as  a  gift  of  nature  [AS 
neoclassical  economics  does--author's note],  scientific 
observation shows that cultural needs are the product of 
upbringing  and  education:  surveys  establish  that  all 
cultural  practices  (museum  visits,  concert-going, 
reading,  etc.),  and  preferences in literature,  painting 
or  music,  are  closely  linked  to  educational  level 
(measured  by qualifications or  length of  schooling)  and 
secondarily  to  social  origin ....  To  the  socially 
4 recognized  hierarchy  of  the  arts,  and  within  each  of 
them,  of genres,  schools or periods,  corresponds a  social 
hierarchy  of  the  consumers.  This  predisposes  tastes  to 
function  as markers  of  "class." 
What  is  the  empirical  evidence  for  the  view  that  social  class 
structures  consumption?  Interestingly,  there  has  been  relatively 
little  recent  empirical  study  from  within  the  academy.  (For  a 
fuller discussion of this issue,  which  surveys the u.s.  evidence, 
see  Schor  1998,  chapter  2.)  Surveying the u.S.  literature,  and to 
a  lesser extent the British and continental,  one finds that earlier 
traditions  which  emphasized  the  class  structuring  of  consumption 
and other social structures have  fallen out of  favor.  The  classic 
American studies such as the the Lynds or Lloyd Warner and his team 
have  not  been repeated  in recent decades.  (references  here)  While 
we  have Bourdieu's wide-ranging data on  France,  which supports his 
thesis,  such  a  study has  not  been replicated for other countries, 
to my  knowledge.  (There are a  few  exceptions,  for example the work 
of  Douglas  Holt  in the  U.S.,  Gerard  Schultze  in  Germany,  and  the 
Manschester popular culture group  in the U.K.) 
However,  market  research  firms  did step in to fill the vaccuum.  A 
variety  of  classificatory  schemes  (zip  code,  census  block,  or 
psychographic)  have  been  developed  which  are  used  to  predict 
consumption  patterns  among  various  sub-segments  of  any  given 
5 population.  4  These  kinds  of  classificatory  schemes  are  in  use 
widely,  and  have  become  standard  practice  in  the  field  of 
marketing.  While they have not been subjected to rigorous academic 
analysis,  they  nevertheless  are  useful  in  showing  the  extent  to 
which  consumption patterns do  in fact correlate to various  socio-
economic variables.  (The most salient of these in the united states 
is the  census  block--a  smaller unit than  the  zipcode,  which  is  a 
strong predictor of household spending patterns.)  Of course, market 
researchers are not  interested in "social class"  as  a  theoretical 
variable,  and therefore have not asked some of the most interesting 
questions from  a  sociological point of view,  i.e., what is the role 
of parental  occupation or education?) 
My  reading  of  the  evidence  for  the u.s.  is that  consumption  does 
remain  structured  by  recognizable  variables,  which  themselves 
correlate to various measures of social class.  The patterns are not 
as clear-cut as  they were  60  years  ago,  when  one  could easily de-
code  class  from  the  contents  of  a  living  room  (see  the  famous 
studies  by  Chapin  using this method).  There  is far  more  variation 
in patterns,  as well  as  many  more  goods  to account  for,  and  there 
are  also  clear differences  in  how  consumption  occurs,  as  well  as 
just  what  is  consumed  (on  this  point,  see  Holt  1998).  Never-
theless,  an underlying social structuration still persists.  In the 
case of less developed countries,  I  would expect that the evidence 
is even stronger,  more akin to what existed in the u.s.  and Europe 
in  the  early  part  of  this  century.  When  there  is  less  income 
6 available for discretionary spending,  intra-class variation will be 
lower,  and  the  order  of  acquisition  of  various  key  durables  and 
other  consumption  goods  is  more  uniform.  In  the  same  way  that  a 
parlor  organ,  or  an  automobile  were  once  sure  signals  of  middle 
class status in the u.s.  and Europe,  so too is a  washing machine or 
a  car in India today. 
B.  An  Important  Externality:  consumption  also  Reproduces  Social 
Class 
Consumption not only reflects a  structure of social inequality; it 
also reproduces it. Having proper taste, wearing the right clothes, 
displaying certain manners,  etc.  are all elements of achieving and 
then maintaining  membership  in  a  privileged  group  in  society.  In 
Bourdieu's  words,  daily  life  is  filled  with  "micro"  acts  of 
claiming  status  which  lead  to  both  inclusion  and  exclusion  from 
favored  groups.  The  privileged  use  consumption  to maintain  group 
identities;  in the labor market consumption is a  signalling device; 
for  centuries  sumptuary  laws  have  proscribed  modes  of  dress  and 
other  spending  activities  in  order  to  maintain  an  existing 
hierarchy.  In  Veblen's  view,  socially  visible,  or  "conspicuous 
consumption"  is the central mechanism  of class reproduction. 
This point  should be  key to analyses of the effect of  consumption 
on  human  welfare.  Because it suggests  that there  is  a  systematic 
negative  externality  associated  with  the  consumption  of  a  large 
class of goods.  namely their role in reproducing ineguality.  (The 
7 externality is negative to the extent that one takes inequality to 
be  a  bad  thing.  There  is  accumulating  evidence  on  the 
instrumentally negative  impacts  of  inequality.) 
c.  The  Dynamic  Process:  The  Prisoner's  Dilemma 
The  cross-sectional  variation  in  spending  patterns  is reproduced 
through  a  dynamic  process  in  which  new  and  upgraded  products  are 
diffused  vertically  through  the  class  structure.s  This  dynamic, 
popularly  known  as  "keeping  up  with  the  Joneses"  is  a  central 
factor  in the continual expansion of  spending.  (Keeping  up  models 
are  variously  referred  to  as  status,  positional,  or  competitive 
models.  They  are  closely related  to  analyses  which  emphasize  the 
cross-sectional  structure  of  consumption.)  (For  these  types  of 
approaches,  see among  others,  Veblen  1899,  Duesenberry 1949,  Frank 
1985a,b,  Hirsch  1976,  Schor  1998,  James  1987,  McAdams  1992, 
Rauscher  1993,  Congleton  1989,  Basmann et al 1988,  and  Neumark and 
Postlewaite 1995,  Brown 1994,  Easterlin 1973,1995,  Clark and Oswald 
1994. ) 
In a  standard status or competitive spending model,  an individual's 
utility depends  negatively on  the  consumption  of others. 
ui  =  f  (Ci/~ aCj)  f'  >  0  (1) 
where U is utility,  C is consumption and a  is the weight applied by 
individual  i  to j's consumption.  Individual i's utility depends  on 
8 the  ratio  of  his  or  her  own  consumption  to  a  weighted  sum  of 
others'  consumption.  Of  course,  other  formulations  are  possible. 
utility may  depend  on  merely  keeping  up  (not  consuming  less than 
others,  or not having less than the average level of consumption.)6 
In its dynamic  version,  new  or upgraded products are adopted  by  a 
small  group  of  innovating  consumers  who  increase their utility by 
raising their relative position.  (They have the new products which 
others haven't acquired.)  Eventually,  adoption of products becomes 
general  as  people attempt to reverse the decline  in their utility 
which  has  occurred  as  a  result  of  their  failure  to  adopt.  Thus, 
products  diffuse  throughout  the  population.  Advertising  and 
marketing  which  promote  information  about  the  products,  or  their 
use  can  speed  up  the diffusion process,  but diffusion would  occur 
even without these efforts of producers. 
In  models  such  as  (1)  above,  one  must  pay  attention  to  the 
informational  process.  How  does  individual  i  know  what  the 
consumption of  j  (or the j's)  is? In small,  open communities,  this 
process is rather transparent.  In modern,  more  anonymous settings, 
the informational requirements themselves become very important.  In 
order to playa role in a  status process,  consumption must  be of  a 
publically  visible  nature.  Thus,  competitive  spending  does  not 
occur with all goods,  but tends to revolve around a  particular set 
of private consumption products.  (Thus equation  (1)  above needs to 
be  amended  to  pertain only  to visible goods.)  Clothing,  housing, 
and  autos  have  traditionally  been  such  important  status  symbols 
9 because they are all accessible to public view,  and use  is easily 
verifiable.?  (See  James  1987,  Bearden and Etzel 1982,  Childers and 
Rao,  1992,  Chao  and Schor 1996;  James  1987,  1993)  savings,  leisure 
time,  insurance,  and household furnishings and appliances which are 
not  seen  by  visitors  play  a  small  role  in  the  status-conferring 
process. 8  This  distinction  between  visible  and  non-visible  goods 
means  that the  former  playa special,  and  privileged role  in  the 
dynamic process.  Because the competitive dimensions of spending are 
confined  to  this  subset  of  goods,  consumers  often  reduce  their 
expenditures on non-status products in order to keep up with status 
goods.  This  occurs  especially  in  periods  when  the  competitive 
spending is intensifying. 
There  are  two  welfare  effects  which  must  be  noted  about  this 
competitive  spending  model.  First,  visible  goods  can  "crowd  out" 
other competing uses  of  income.  The  four  major  competing uses  are 
leisure,  savings,  public  goods  (including  the  environment),  and 
non-visible private consumption.  Second,  there is a  self-defeating 
aspect to the process,  because increases in consumption tend to be 
general.  (See  Frank  1985a,b)  They  therefore  confer  no  additional 
utility,  because all utility is positional.  This  of  course is the 
Prisoner's  Dilemma  aspect  of  the  model--everyone  would  be  better 
cooperating  because  consumption  has  costs  (labor  expended, 
environmental costs,  leisure costs, etc.). But without an entity to 
create cooperation,  the worst  outcome  for all will result. 
10 The  Prisoner's Dilemma  aspect of the competitive  spending process 
is itself a  powerful critique of consumption and its connection to 
human well-being.  Of course,  the extent to which utility depends on 
positional,  rather  than  absolute  consumption  is  ultimately  an 
empirical question.  (The standard practice of assuming  away inter-
personal  comparisons  ignores this model  altogether,  and therefore 
the existing literature provides little evidence.)  The macro cross-
sectional evidence  on  the failure of  increases  in  income to yield 
increases  in  subjective  well-being  is  consistent  with  a  strong 
positional  focus.  (The  income  increases  are  general.)  (See  Lane 
1991,1994;  Easterlin 1973,1995;  Diener et al 1993,  Veenhoven  1991) 
However,  I  would  caution against  reading  too  much  into the  time-
series evidence.  Because rising incomes and development generate a 
variety  of  changes  in  society,  the  lack  of  a  rise  in  subjective 
well-being  is difficult to interpret.  It could be that the higher 
utility created  by  more  income  is offset  by  the  decline  in  free 
time,  the  erosion  of  traditional  values  and  social  structures,  a 
worsening environment,  and the like. On  the other hand,  micro level 
data which shows that positional concerns dominate subjective well-
being  (Clark  and  Oswald  1994)  provides  strong  support  for  the 
competitive model. 
III. What's New?  Globalisation,  Inequality,  and the New  Consumerism 
A.  A Historical Point:  social Mobility and  the Role of competitive 
Spending 
The  twentieth century has seen the erosion of  a  host of restraints 
11 which  limited  consumption  in  previous  eras.  On  the  one  hand, 
cultural restraints such as the invocation of the "evil eye"  (which 
warns against ostentatious or excessive spending),  have diminished 
as  commercial  culture  replaces  folk  culture  around  the  world.  9 
Second,  as  secular  culture  replaces  religion,  moral  strictures 
against  consumption  lose  their  efficacy.  (A  counter-weight, 
however,  is the growth  of  fundamentalist  religious movements.)  By 
the 1920s in the U.S.,  for example,  a  new "religion" of consumerism 
emerged,  in  which  spending,  and  spending  without  limit,  even 
excessively,  was  extolled as  something positive,  therapeutic,  and 
of benefit to the economy.  The old saving ethic was  abandoned.  (See 
Lears,  Leach,  and  others  on  this  period.)  Hitherto  uncharted 
territory had been entered,  in which  a  society of mass  consumption 
was created with few cultural or moral restraints on spending.  (One 
might  argue  that Americans  have  had  difficulty maintaining  self-
restraint in this  environment,  on  the  basis  of  trends  in  saving, 
consumer  debt,  compulsive  buying,  shoplifting,  etc.) 
The third development is that a  more fluid social structure reduced 
class-based  restraints  on  spending.  In  previous  eras,  the  class 
structure  of  consumption  was  reproduced  in part  through  cultural 
pressures not to spend "out of one's station."  (Sumptuary laws were 
the legal embodiment of these pressures.  Of  course,  sumptuary laws 
were  not  typically  very  effective,  but  they  do  signal  something 
about the cultural restraints.)  By  the twentieth century in the US 
and somewhat later in Europe,  the  system became far more open,  and 
12 it was  possible for  a  much  wider  range  of  individuals to spend  as 
the rich or middle classes did  (if they could find the  income).  In 
so  doing,  individuals  attempted  to  "consume"  their  way  into  the 
group they  aspired to. 
Thus,  in the past,  when  status  was  determined  by  birth,  history, 
caste and  so on,  consumption played only  a  subsidiary role in the 
maintenance  of  social  position.  But  in  societies  where  these 
factors  have  broken  down,  and  status  is  a  more  fluid  currency, 
consumption becomes more important. Urbanization,  formal education, 
and  the  disappearance  of  traditional  social  relationships  render 
spending  more  salient in the establishment of social position and 
personal identity. In the modern consumer society,  commodities take 
on  a  new  kind  of  symbolic  importance.  (Consumption  has  symbolic 
importance  in all societies,  but  in  consumer  society its role  in 
establishing  personal  identity  and  social  position  eclipse  its 
symbolic role in ritual, religion and so on.)  More  and more,  "what 
you wear"  and what  you don't wear define who  you are and where you 
are  located  on  the  social  map.  (See  Holman  1981,  Belk  1988, 
MCCracken  1990) 
While  the  social  fluidity  of  the  present  is  to  be  applauded,  it 
exacts  a  price.  Individuals  face  more  pressure  to  use  income  to 
gain  access  to  a  desired  social  group.  This  is  particularly 
problematic  in  contexts  where  failing  to  achieve  a  middle  class 
status is increasingly socially uncomfortable.  In those cases,  the 
13 pressures  on  individuals  and  household  to  spend  to  achieve  some 
measure  of  status can  be  intense. 
B.  The  post-WWII  "cycle of  work  and  spend" 
The  advent  of  "Fordism"  in  the  post-WWII  period  in  the 
industrialized West and to a  varying extent in other countries  (See 
Jong-Il and  Schor  1995b for  a  global discussion of  Fordism)  led to 
a  particular relationship  between  productivity,  consumption,  and 
hours of work.  The hallmark of Fordism has been the coincidence of 
mass  production  and  mass  consumption,  made  possible  by  the 
channeling  of  productivity  growth  into real  wage  growth.  Workers 
reaped  the  fruits  of  their  more  productive  labor  in  the  form  of 
higher  wages,  which  they  then  spent  on  the  steady  stream of  mass 
production  goods  they  were  making.  (Cars,  household  appliances, 
clothing,  etc.)  In  contrast  to  the  earlier  period  (approx  1875-
1945),  hours of work fell relatively little in after 1945,  because 
wage  growth  took  a  much  larger  fraction  of  the  productivity 
dividend.  (For this argument,  see Schor  1990,  Schor 1995a.  For the 
historical  data,  see  also  Madison  1987.)  I  have  described  this 
process elsewhere as as  "the cycle of work  and spend,"  a  situation 
in  stable  hours  and  rising  spending  give  rise  to  a  continual 
frustration of  ex  ante preferences with respect to time  and  money 
tradeoffs  (workers  would prefer to trade future  income  for  time), 
and  lead  to  a  continual  adapatation  of  ex  post  preferences  to 
accommodate the situation of stable hours.  (Workers  end up wanting 
the  time-money  tradeoff  they  have  gotten,  rather  than,  as  in the 
14 neoclassical sovereignty model,  getting what they want.)  (See Schor 
1992,  chapter  5  on  work  and  spend.)  "Work  and  spend"  owes  its 
existence to a  failure in the market for hours  (it does not exist) , 
and  constitutes  another  structural  criticism  of  the  spending 
outcomes  produced  by  the  contemporary  economy.  (The  neoclassical 
sovereignty model  is not supported by evidence about how hours are 
determined.)  Thus,  contemporary  market  economies  tend  to  operate 
with an output-bias,  in which productivity growth is channeled into 
more  spending,  rather  than  additional  free  time.  In  the  United 
States,  this bias against leisure time is sufficiently strong that 
approximately  a  third  of  all  workers  now  report  high  levels  of 
stress  and  an  excessive  pace  of  life.  (See  Robinson  and  Godbey), 
and  increasing  numbers  (between  15%  and  a  third)  say  they  would 
prefer to trade income  for time.  (See  Schor  1997b on the evolution 
of these preferences.) 
C.  The  new consumerism and changes in the "keeping up process":  the 
growing  importance  of  the  top  20% 
Classic  postwar  descriptions  of  the  keeping  up  process  such  as 
those  of  Duesenberry,  or  Frank,  emphasize  the  role  of  proximate 
comparison.  (See also the seminal statement by Festinger 1954.)  In 
addition,  Duesenberry's influential account of the u.S.  evoked the 
image of a  middle class suburban model characterized by inclusion, 
rather than exclusion.  There were smiths and Joneses,  and they were 
very similar.  Such a  description,  of course,  was accurate given the 
era--the middle  class  was  growing,  and  the  popular  wisdom  had  it 
15 that it would  encompass all other classes.  The nation,  and with it 
spending patterns,  were  "homogeneizing." 
Beginning  in  the  1980s,  I  believe  this  model  was  no  longer 
applicable  to  the  u. s.  I  call  the  new  situation  "the  new 
consumerism. "  The  new  consumerism  is  more  upscale,  and  more 
Veblenian,  in the sense that there is more aggressive,  rather than 
defensive  positioning.  The  first  major  change  was  that  the 
distribution  of  income  was  becoming  more  unequal.  This  process 
began in the 1970s,  but accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s.  The top 
20%  of the distribution has  increased its share of  income,  at the 
expense of the bottom 80%.  And  within the top  20%,  income has also 
become  more  inequal,  with  more  flowing  to  the  top  5%.  One 
consequence  of  this  change  has  been  an  intensification  of 
competitive  spending.  Beginning  in the early 1980s  among  the rich 
and  super-rich,  conspicuous  consumption  (in  visible  goods) 
intensified.  In  response,  the  next  15%  of  the  top  20%  also 
increased  their  conspicuous  spending.  (This  was  the  so-called 
"decade  of  greed.")  The  80%  below,  while  gaining  some  ground  in 
absolute  terms,  lost  relatively  to  the  top  20%.  Among  the  80%, 
consumer dissatisfaction and pessimism,  as well as increased status 
consumption resulted. 
The  second major  change  in the keeping up  process was  the growing 
salience of the lifestyles of the top 20%  as a  focus of comparison. 
(In the terms of equation  (1)  above,  the Cj  has become Cj20%,  i.e., 
16 the consumption  level of the top  20%  of the  income  distribution.) 
In the past,  as I  have noted,  proximate comparison was the backbone 
of  the  keeping  up  process.  Because  keeping  up  was  mainly 
neighborhood-based,  people  looked  mainly  at  others  with  similar 
incomes.  By  the 1980s,  the neighborhood had declined as  a  focus  of 
social  interaction.  Two  alternative  sources  of  comparison  had 
emerged:  the  workplace  and  the  television.  As  women  entered  the 
workforce  in larger numbers,  and  often in white collar  jobs,  they 
were  exposed  to  a  more  diverse  reference  group.  Thus,  they  were 
more  likely  to  engage  in  more  upward  consumption  or  lifestyle 
comparison.  (Comparison  with  their  superior,  for  example,  rather 
than  their  neighbor.)  Second,  as  people  spent  less  time  in  the 
homes  of  neighbors  and  friends,  and  more  time  in  front  of  the 
television and watching  other popular media,  the media  has  become 
increasingly  important  in 
patterns.  (Higher  levels 
providing  information  about  spending 
of  privacy  have  led  to  less  direct 
exposure to others'  possessions.)  Because the popular  media,  (and 
particularly television)  gives a  heavily skewed picture of spending 
patterns (it portrays almost exclusively the upper middle class and 
the  rich  ),  it has  played  an  especially  important  role  in  the 
"upscaling  of  aspirations."  (On  the  impact  of  television  in 
inflating  consumer  aspirations,  and  on  the  correlation  between 
television watching  and  spending,  see  Schor  1998,  chapter 4.) 
Thus,  the  keeping  up  process  has  undergone  a  major,  highly 
problematic  change  in  the  last  15-20  years  in  the  u.S.  The 
17 lifestyles  of  the  top  20%  have  become  cultural  icons,  which  are 
looked to by those with far  less  income  as  increasingly necessary 
and  worth  having.  In  one  study  of  consumers,  researchers  Susan 
Fournier and Michael Guiry  found that 35%  aspired to reach the top 
6%  of the income distribution,  and another  49%  aspired to the next 
12%.  Only  15%  of their sample reported that they would be satisfied 
wi th  " living  a  comfortable  life,  "  i.  e.,  being  middle  class. 
(Fournier  and  Guiry  1991,  pp.  16-17)  (See  Schor  1998,  chapter  1, 
for other evidence  about the upscaling of  consumer desire.) 
The  growth  of  upward  comparison  means  that what  we  might call the 
aspirational  gap  has  increased.  I  define  the  aspirational  gap  as 
the  difference  between  the  income  required  to  sustain  the 
consumption pattern to which  one aspires and one's actual  income. 
As  "upscale"  lifestyles  increasingly  dominate  aspirations,  the 
aspirational  gap  grows.  The  vast  majority  of  consumers  find 
themselves  structurally  frustrated,  because  their  incomes  are 
always  inadequate  to  satisfy their desires.  Whereas  in  the past, 
the aspirational gap might have been on the order of  20%,  it is now 
much higher.  (One survey of u.s.  households found that the level of 
income  needed  to fulfill  one's  dream,  i.e.,  satisfy aspirations, 
doubled beween  1986  and  1994,  and is currently more than twice the 
national median household  income.  See  Schor  1998,  chapter 1.)  One 
can  speculate about  the relationship between the aspirational gap 
and  a  range  of  dysfunctional  consumer  behaviors  which  have 
increased  markedly  over  the  same  period.  I  refer  here  to  the 
18 decline  in  household  savings,  the  rise  in  credit  card  debt 
(especially  among  higher  income  households),  the  growth  of 
shoplifting,  the  increase  in  violent  crime  in  order  to  obtain 
particular status goods  (athletic shoes,  leather jackets,  designer 
sunglasses),  and  the  incidence  (and  possible  increase)  in 
compulsive  buying  syndrome. 
The increasing purchase and importance of branded,  status goods  (as 
well as their cheap,  counterfeit versions)  is another indicator of 
the  growing  importance  of  affluent  lifestyles.  Visible  labels 
appear to have proliferated to a  whole range of products which were 
previously  not  heavily  "branded"  or  symbolized.  (I  say  appear 
because I  have not yet found academic research on the prevalence of 
branded goods.) 
The  previous  findings  of  the  HDR  (1996)  that  inequality  is 
increasing on a  global scale are worth re-visiting in this context. 
For  the growth  of  inequality is likely to lead to an  upward  shift 
in  consumption  comparison,  and  a  resulting  increase  in  the 
aspirational gap. 
D.  G1obalisation  and  the Aspirational  Gap 
I  have  confined  my  discussion  thus  far  to  the  ways  in  which 
consumption  dynamics  have  changed  in  the  U. s.  I  believe  these 
developments  are  also relevant  around  the  globe,  to  a  greater or 
lesser  extent  depending  on  the  country.  This  is  for  a  number  of 
19 reasons:  the role of  American  consumer multinationals,  the growth 
of a  worldwide popular media  and electronic communications system, 
and global  trends  in inequality. 
The  first point is that American  consumer  products  companies  are 
operating  around  the  globe,  marketing  and  advertising  western 
products in a  wide variety of cultures.  Consumers are encouraged to 
give  up  domestic  versions  of  products;  to  switch  from  non-
commodified activities (such as teeth cleaning using a  tree branch) 
to commodified provision  (tooth brush and paste); or to acquire new 
products which are available only from Western providers.  In Europe 
this  process  is  most  well-developed;  but  it  has  been  growing 
substantially  in  Asia,  Africa,  and  Latin  America  as  well,  among 
both  "middle  classes"  and  the  poor.  We  are  aware  of  the  most 
dramatic,  and  "scandalous"  of  these  examples:  the  association  of 
infant  mortality  with  formula-feeding;  the  existence  of 
"comerciogenic malnutrition"  as people  sUbstitute Coke  and potato 
chips  for  healthier  traditional  foods;  or  the  Avon  ladies  who 
paddle  down  the  Amazon  River  inducing  poor  women  to  spend  large 
fractions  of their meager  incomes  on  cosmetics.'o 
But  even  apart  from  these  dramatic  examples,  the  role  of  branded 
Western products is worth considering.  While it is certainly true 
that branded products currently represent only a  fraction of total 
consumption outside the industrialized countries,  they are central 
to the operation of  a  competitive  consumption model,  their growth 
20 is  laying  the  groundwork  for  its  proliferation  and  deepening. 
Furthermore,  other behavioral aspects of the American companies are 
worth  considering.  These  include  the  shortening  of  the  product 
lifecycle;  high  levels  of  advertising  and  marketing  relative  to 
production  costs  (ie.,  a  high  symbolic  content  to  goods);  an 
emphasis  on what has been called "commodity aesthetics"  (ie., high 
investment  in  the  aesthetics  of  design);  and  ecological 
unsustainability in production and use. 
Second,  as  American  and  other Western  popular  media  becomes  more 
important around the globe,  we  can expect it to play an  increasing 
role  in  setting  consumer  aspirations.  The  Western  top  20%  will 
increasingly  become  the  aspirational  standard  around  the  globe. 
Just as Americans who  are heavy television watchers come to believe 
that  a  swimming  pool  or  a  luxury  car  is  an  American  consumption 
norm,  so too will villagers in China  or Brazil.  An  affluent,  out-
of-reach  lifestyle  will  increasingly  seem  normal,  and  hence 
necessary  to  attain.  A  profound  structural  aspirational  gap  has 
already begun and will continue to emerge.  That gap will exacerbate 
pressures  from  elite  and  middle  class  groups  to  increase  their 
share of  national  income. 
Thus,  my  view of the current situation is this:  On  a  global basis, 
consumer culture is intensifying a  competitive spending process in 
which there are no  limits,  in which  a  structural,  aspirational gap 
is  ubiquitous  and  growing,  and  in  which  alternatives  which  have 
21 been  shown  to  contribute  far  more  to  human  development  (leisure, 
savings,  public  goods)  are  being  crowded  out  by  private  status 
goods.  This  profound market  failure  at the heart  of  contemporary 
consumer  culture  must  be  addressed  if  human  development  is  to 
proceed. 
D.  Research  strategy 
How  might  one  flesh  out the picture  I  have  painted above?  In this 
section I  make  some suggestions about the kinds of data which would 
illustrate  various  aspects  of  the  story  I  have  told.  I  do  not 
pretend that these data sources are the easiest to find.  Government 
data  rarely  identifies  brands,  or  narrow  enough  commodity 
categories  to  be  of  use.  But  through  various  contacts  it may  be 
possible to  obtain enough  proprietary data to provide  an  engaging 
picture of some of the kinds of trends I  have been discussing.  Here 
are my  suggestions. 
1.  Data  on the existence of the competitive spending process.  This 
is a  very hard nut to crack.  I  have done  some  of my  own  work  on the 
US  which  I  can share with you,  but such an approach is not feasible 
for your timeline,  I  don't believe.  The one exception is if you can 
get brand buying data for  some products and analyze it, as I  did in 
my  cosmetics paper.  (I will provide it to you.) 
The  other way  to go  is to think specifically about branded goods. 
You  could  look for data  on  fraction of  goods  which are  "branded," 
22 i.  e.,  have  an  identifiable  brand  name  identity.  For  Southern 
countries,  it would be useful to have data on size of the consumer 
market  for  western,  branded  goods.  [Here  I  would  go  first to  the 
market  research  firms  and  the proprietary data.]  If such  data  is 
not available,  you could settle for data on advertising of consumer 
products.  [You might also call some people at Business  Schools for 
help  on  what's available and  how  to access it.  Try  Susan  Fournier 
at Harvard,  in the Marketing Dept.  Also  Grant McCracken,  formerly 
an  academic  researcher,  now  a  consultant for  Coke,  etc.  should be 
an interesting person to approach.  Another very interesting person 
is Malcolm Gladwell at the New  Yorker.  He  is into the latest trends 
in  consumer  behavior.  He  could  also  probably  help  with  data. 
Finaly,  in this vein,  I  would contact a  few advertising people and 
sit down  with  them  for  some  discussions.  They  should  be  able  to 
steer you towards good data.  I  don't have contacts myself,  but you 
might call Mark Crispin Miller  (a prominent ad critic, was at Johns 
Hopkins.  He  should have  some  ideas for contacts.)] 
How  about something on the high symbolic content of  some products, 
eg,  athletic shoes?  Get the data on Nike's production costs versus 
promotion  costs  ($150  shoes  cost  about  $1  to  make.)  Do  a  box  on 
this which highlights both the costs to consumers  of creating the 
symbols,  the  exploitative  conditions  for  the  producers,  and  the 
hypocrisy of the  company. 
In this vein,  I  would also focus  on  some  youth  issues.  The  growth 
23 of materialism and  immersion in the commercial culture is greatest 
among  youth.  McCracken  has  been  looking at youth,  I  believe. 
2.  Data  on  upscaling  of  consumption  aspirations  or  even  more 
broadly  (and  easier  to  get)  on  extent  of  materialism  among  the 
population.  [There  is the  European  Values  survey,  and  comparable 
data  for  the  US  and  Japan.  Call  Ronald  Englehart  at Michigan  and 
ask for his help in locating survey data on  consumer aspirations.] 
This is easier. 
3.  Data  on  popular  media  consumption,  and  the  content  of  popular 
media.  (Fraction of shows exported which  show affluent lifestyles, 
data on television viewing around the world.  [Ask Neillson people. 
Advertising data  should also be useful here.) 
4.  Data  on  dysfunctional  outcomes  of  the  competitive  spending 
model:  expansion  of  consumer  credit,  trends  in  savings  rates, 
personal bankruptcy rates.  Also,  data on criminal behavior related 
to consumption.  (shoplifting,  larceny, etc.) And data on compulsive 
shopping.  Exists  for  the  US  [ask  Ronald  Faber,  University  of 
Minnesota.  He  would  probably  know  about  Europe.] 
5.  On  reduced  product  lifecycles,  you  might  contact  companies 
directly for help.  Try Proctor and Gamble.  Or Unilever.  Phillips or 
Sony.  Or  the  sneaker  companies.  How  long  do  their models  stay  on 
the shelves? 
24 6.  Contact Adbusters.  They ran a  piece recently on the existence of 
"Genuine  Progress  Indicators"  (ie.,  alternatives  to  GDP)  in  a 
variety  of  countries.  If  you  have  a  section  whose  message  is 
"consumption does  not create human welfare,"  these would  be great 
addi  tions.  (The  Autumn  1997  issue  of  Adbusters  reports  on  the 
Australian measure,  and says that 8  think tanks have a  joint effort 
on  this--including UK,  USA,  Germany,  and  Sweden). 
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28 1.  I  will use the word  goods  as  a  shorthand  for  goods  and 
services. 
2.  Of  course,  other structural characteristics,  such  as  age,  sex, 
locale,  and  ethnicity also structure consumption.  Some  of these 
characteristics are theoretically rather unproblematic  (locale, 
age);  others are theoretically quite  important  (sex,  ethnicity). 
I  do  not address  these in this paper. 
3.  This  is not to say that Bourdieu's structuralism has  no 
limits--he also allows  for  individual variation through the 
concept of  the habitus.  (The  habitus is a  set of  social 
conditionings,  or  "open set of dispositions,"  the mental  schema 
that individuals use  for  subjectively processing the objective 
world  around  them.) 
4.  Note  describing these classification schemes. 
5.  See  Frances  Stewart's paper  for  the  HDR  on  the  importance of 
the continual expansion  in consumption. 
6.  The  issue of  "reference groups"  (i.e.,  the identity of the 
j's)  is not well understood.  with whom  are people  comparing 
themselves?  It has  been often noted that comparisons  are made 
locally,  rather than globally.  In related research we  are 
gathering empirical  evidence  on  the constitution and  dynamics  of 
reference groups.  See  Schor  1998,  forthcoming.  See also 
Tefertiller 1994  on  reference groups  among  middle-income  American 
teens,  and  the  impact  of  a  national mass  media  on the  formation 
of reference groups.  See  also Festinger  1954,  Park and Lessig 
1977,  Bearden  and  Etzel  1982,  and  Bearden,  Netemeyer  and  Teel 
1989,  among  others. 
7.  The  extent of visibility is not purely  inherent  in  a  good,  but 
is also  a  product of the efforts of marketers.  See  James  19XX  and 
Schor  1998,  chapter  2. 
8.  Tourism is an  interesting case of  a  formerly  low visibility 
good  which  has  increasingly become  a  status product,  in part 
because of the prevalence of  "markers"  (souvenirs)  to  show that 
one  has  taken  a  particular trip. 
9.  On  consumption restraints in primitive societies,  see  Campbell 
19XX  and  Belk  19XX. 
10.  NPR  transcript.  The  woman  profiled  in this piece spent  10%  of 
her monthly  income  on  one  Avon  product. 
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